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We examine the extent to which an individual's actual insurance and investment choices display a
stable ranking in willingness to bear risk, relative to his peers, across different contexts. We do so
by examining the same individuals' decisions regarding their 401(k) asset allocations and their choices
in five different employer-provided insurance domains, including health and disability insurance. We
reject the null that there is no domain-general component of preferences. Among the five insurance
domains, the magnitude of the domain-general component of preferences appears substantial; we find
for example that one's choices in other insurance domains are substantially more predictive of one's
choice in a given insurance domain than either one's detailed demographic characteristics or one's
claims experience in that domain. However, we find considerably less predictive power between one's
insurance choices and the riskiness of one's 401(k) asset allocations, suggesting that the common element
of an individual's preferences may be stronger among domains that are "closer" in context. We also
find that the relationship between insurance and investment choices appears considerably larger for
employees who may be associated with better "financial sophistication." Overall, we view our findings
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Standard models in many ￿elds of economics ￿ most notably macroeconomics, ￿nance, public
￿nance, and labor economics ￿generally use a canonical model for decisions under uncertainty, in
which individuals (or households) have a single, concave utility function over wealth, which gives
rise to context-invariant risk preferences. Guided by this assumption, standard practice in these
literatures is to use external estimates of risk aversion parameters, drawn from a variety of speci￿c
contexts, to calibrate their models. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a large literature
in psychology and behavioral economics arguing that context is king, and that there is little, if
any, commonality in how the same individual makes decisions across di⁄erent contexts. Where
does reality lie relative to these two extremes? Our aim in this paper is to provide new empirical
evidence that informs this issue by using a unique data set on thousands of individuals￿insurance
and investment choices.
We examine the actual choices that the same individuals make over ￿nancial lotteries in di⁄erent
domains. Speci￿cally, we examine the workplace-based bene￿t choices that Alcoa employees make
concerning their 401(k) asset allocations, their disability insurance, and their insurance choices
regarding health, drug, and dental expenditures. Using these data we investigate the stability in
ranking across contexts of an individual￿ s willingness to bear risk relative to his peers. In other
words, we investigate how well an individual￿ s willingness to bear risk (relative to his peers) in one
context predicts his willingness to bear risk (relative to his peers) in other contexts.
There are several attractive features of our setting for this purpose. First, all the decisions
are solely over the extent of exposure to purely ￿nancial risk; this reduces concerns about other
possible domain-speci￿c components of preferences, such as an individual￿ s monetary valuation of
health. Second, and relatedly, the nature of the contract options makes the di⁄erent choices within
each domain vertically rankable in terms of risk exposure. As a result, we can use these data to
investigate the extent to which an individual￿ s risk aversion relative to his peers in one domain can
inform us about his risk aversion relative to those same peers in other contexts. Third, as we shall
see, the risk exposure involved in these choices is non-trivial, so that the decisions we observe are
economically meaningful. Finally, many of the domains involve risks of similar magnitudes, making
the Rabin critique of expected utility theory (Rabin, 2000) less relevant in our setting.
Much of our focus is on attempting to quantify the empirical importance of any individual-
speci￿c, domain-general component of preferences. We give considerable attention to trying to
develop relevant and useful benchmarks with which to gauge the question of ￿empirical importance.￿
This choice of focus is motivated by two factors. First, neither extreme null hypothesis ￿that of
complete consistency or no consistency in preferences across domains ￿seems (to us) particularly
compelling in practice. Reality almost surely lies in between these two extremes. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, as we discuss in more detail below, while it is relatively easy to test the
null hypothesis that there is no domain general component to preferences (and we will do so), we
argue that it is considerably more challenging (perhaps even impossible) to robustly test the other
extreme hypothesis that individuals￿decisions are completely consistent across domains. Tests of
1the latter hypothesis would inevitably consist of a joint test of the null hypothesis of domain-general
preferences as well as a set of di¢ cult-to-test modeling assumptions.
Our results reject the null hypothesis that there is no domain general component of preferences.
More interestingly, in our view, we develop several measures that help us assess the extent of this
domain-general component of preferences, and we ￿nd it to be quantitatively quite important. For
example, we estimate that the correlation coe¢ cients that would arise from stylized, calibrated
models of coverage choices under fully domain general preferences are quite comparable in magni-
tude to the actual correlations obtained between choices in di⁄erent insurance domains (although
considerably higher than the estimated correlations obtained between 401(k) portfolio allocations
and insurance choices). In addition, we ￿nd that one￿ s choices in other insurance domains have
about four times more predictive power for one￿ s choice in a given insurance domain than do a
rich set of demographics. However, we do ￿nd that the riskiness of one￿ s 401(k) portfolio choice
has statistically signi￿cant but quantitatively much smaller predictive power for one￿ s insurance
choices. Interestingly, we also ￿nd that predictive power of one￿ s 401(k) portfolio choice for one￿ s
insurance choices is systematically greater for individuals who are older, more experienced with
the ￿rm, have higher income, or who appear to be more ￿nancially sophisticated decision makers
(measured based on external proxies in the data). This suggests that such individuals may ￿t
better the canonical model. Overall, we view our ￿ndings as generally supportive of the canonical
domain-general model of decision making under uncertainty, although they call into question the
external validity of risk preferences obtained from contexts that are too far apart or from certain
types of populations.
Our study is not unique in its interest in the relative generality of risk preferences across
di⁄erent contexts. Not surprisingly, given its importance, the stability of risk preferences across
domains has received considerable attention in the economics literature.1 Several studies have
addressed the stability of risk preferences by investigating individual responses to hypothetical
questions regarding ￿nancial lotteries across di⁄erent types of lotteries and over time (Choi et al.,
2007; Andersen et al., 2008; Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro, 2009). Cutler and Glaeser (2005) used a
similar approach to investigate correlations in health-related behaviors, for which they use data on
self-reported behaviors such as smoking and drinking rather than answers to hypothetical lotteries.
The in￿ uential paper by Barsky et al. (1997) has analyzed similar hypothetical questions and also
validated the responses to some of these questions by investigating whether they are correlated
with self-reported behaviors.2 A recent important study by Dohmen et al. (2009) is probably the
closest to our current study; somewhat similar to Barsky et al. (1997), Dohmen et al. (2009)
use a large data set of survey responses to hypothetical ￿nancial lottery questions and validate
1Naturally, there is also an important related literature in psychology. Although we do not cover it in detail,
many of its features are quite similar to the economics literature we do cover. See, for example, Slovic (1962, 1972a,
1972b) for earlier reviews of this literature and Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) for a recent paper. See also Schoemaker
(1993), who provides an interesting discussion of the contrasting conceptual frameworks by which economists and
psychologists address the issue.
2See also Chabris et al. (2008) for a similar exercise that focuses on discount rate (rather than on risk preferences).
2these responses using self-reported behaviors of a subset of the respondents. Like us, they ￿nd an
important component of domain-general risk preferences and conclude that although its absolute
explanatory power is small, it performs pretty well when compared to other predictors of risk taking.
Our paper di⁄ers from this existing literature in several respects. Perhaps most importantly,
a common element of all these papers is that they use lab experiments, individual responses to
hypothetical questions, or self-reported behaviors. A possible concern with such measures for
assessing the domain-generality of an individual￿ s risk preferences is that there may be important
individual-speci￿c elements that a⁄ect the mapping from self reported or elicited preferences to
actual preferences, which may appear as domain-general preferences. We therefore view the analysis
in this paper ￿which is based on actual market choices and therefore not subject to this concern
￿as an important contribution.
We are aware of only one other study of the stability of risk preferences across contexts which
uses actual market outcomes. Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2009) have recently used
data on three similar deductible choices made in the context of auto and homeowner insurance
to estimate an individual￿ s risk aversion in each domain and to test whether they can reject the
null that risk aversion is completely general across domains. Our paper di⁄ers from theirs in its
scope ￿ we look at a much wider range of di⁄erent domains ￿ and, relatedly, in its focus and
empirical approach. While we focus on the extent to which an individual￿ s risk aversion relative
to his peers in a given context can inform us about his risk aversion relative to those same peers
in other contexts, Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2009) focus on testing whether the level
of risk aversion displayed in di⁄erent contexts is completely stable across contexts; they reject the
null of fully domain general risk aversion. Their question is a more ambitious one, but relies on
commensurately greater modeling assumptions as we discuss in more detail below. We therefore
view the two approaches (and their results) as highly complementary.
Another contribution of our paper ￿which also applies to the papers by Chabris et al. (2008)
and Dohmen et al. (2009) ￿ is our attempt to quantify the magnitude of any domain general
component of preferences by benchmarking it against reasonable alternatives. Most of the studies
we have discussed generally ￿nd some common element in risk taking within an individual across
decisions (or behaviors), although for the most part they tend to argue ￿on mostly subjective
grounds ￿that this common element is ￿small.￿One of our ￿ndings is that the ostensibly ￿small￿
R2s that many prior papers have found may not in fact be as small when compared to relevant
benchmarks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our institutional setting and data.
Section 3 presents our estimation strategy, emphasizing the di¢ culty of constructing robust tests
for whether preferences are fully domain general, and motivating our focus on providing metrics
for quantifying the magnitude of any detected domain-general preferences. Section 4 presents the
results, and the last section concludes.
32 Setting and Data
We analyze the employee bene￿t choices from 2004 for the U.S.-based workers at Alcoa, Inc., a
large multinational producer of aluminum and aluminum-related products. In 2004 Alcoa had
approximately 45,000 active U.S. employees working at about 300 di⁄erent plants located in 39
states.
We focus primarily on choices made in 2004 because Alcoa introduced a new set of bene￿t
options in 2004, requiring workers to make new, ￿active￿choices in many of the domains we study.
As a result, the problems of inferring preferences from ￿stale￿ choices is minimized; this could
be particularly concerning if individuals might have made their choices about di⁄erent bene￿ts at
di⁄erent points in time.
We examine employee choices in six di⁄erent contexts. These include ￿ve insurance coverage
decisions (health, prescription drugs, dental, and short-term and long-term disability) and one case
of asset allocation of the employee￿ s 401(k) contributions. All insurance choices are made during
the ￿open enrollment￿period in November, and apply to the subsequent calendar year. The 401(k)
contributions are made automatically every pay-period according to already chosen investment
allocations, which in principle could be adjusted at any given time (although in practice only about
one quarter of employees in our sample change the allocation of their contributions during a given
year). For each choice we observe the menu of options the employee faces (including prices) and
the employee￿ s choice from the menu. We also observe detailed demographic information on the
employees and detailed information on the realization of risk during the coverage period.
Prices for the bene￿t options vary across employees for two reasons. First, for the health, drug,
and dental domains, employees have a choice of coverage tier; that is, whether to cover themselves
only, or to include their spouse, their children, or the entire family. Throughout this paper we take
the coverage tier as given, assuming that it is primarily driven by family structure; we show below
that our results are not sensitive to controlling for coverage tier. There is also important cross-
sectional variation in the prices associated with each of the insurance options as well as in employer
match rates for 401(k) contributions, which we will control for in our analysis using bene￿t menu
￿xed e⁄ects.3
Baseline sample Our baseline sample makes a number of restrictions that bring the original 2004
sample of approximately 45,000 active employees down to just under 13,000 employees. First, we
restrict our sample to those who were o⁄ered the new bene￿ts in 2004; this includes approximately
3Speci￿cally, the prices faced by the employee are determined by which section of the company the employee is in.
Alcoa has about 40 di⁄erent sections (￿business units￿ ). In 2004, each section￿ s head could select from among the
o⁄ered ￿menus￿of bene￿t prices set by Alcoa headquarters (see Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010) for a much
more detailed description). In our sample, there are 20 di⁄erent possible bene￿t menus which we control for in the
analysis using bene￿t menu ￿xed e⁄ects. For health, drug and dental the menus vary in the employee premiums. For
short-term and long-term disability they vary in the replacement rate associated with the (￿xed) premium, although
the incremental coverage is almost always the same across menus. In the 401(k) domain employees face one of four
di⁄erent possible employer match rates (0, 50%, 75%, or 100%).
4all salaried employees but only about one-half of hourly employees, since the bene￿ts provided to
union employees (who are all hourly employees) can only change when the union contract expires
(so most union employees experienced the change in bene￿ts only in subsequent years). That
brings our sample size down to about 26,000 employees. We further restrict the sample to those
for which we observe full data on the options they are o⁄ered, the choices made, and (for insurance
choices) the ex-post realized risk (claims). This precludes, for example, about 8% of the individuals
who chose to opt out from Alcoa-provided health and drug insurance coverage and about 11% of
employees who chose HMO coverage.4 We also drop about 22% of the remaining employees who
(because of a choice made by their section manager) are not o⁄ered long-term disability insurance,
as well as the approximately 20% of employees who do not contribute to their 401(k) account.5 In
some of our robustness analyses we add back some of these excluded individuals.
Our ￿nal baseline sample contains 12,752 employees. Panel A of Table 1 provides demographic
characteristics for this sample. The sample is almost three quarters male and 85 percent white,
with an average age of 44, an average job tenure (within Alcoa) of 13 years, and an average annual
salary of $58,400. Only about one-third of the sample is hourly employees and virtually none are
unionized (due to our requirement that they face the new bene￿t option in 2004). The average
number of covered individuals per employee is 2.9. Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics
on the annual payouts for each of the six domains. We now describe the options in each domain in
more detail.
Description of coverage options As mentioned, we investigate employee￿ s choices over six
di⁄erent domains. Table 2 attempts to summarize the key features of each domain, with the
options enumerated within each domain (as they are in the Alcoa brochures) from the lowest level
of coverage (option 1) to the option that o⁄ers the most coverage. Appendix Tables A1 and A2
provide more detailed information on each bene￿t option.
The ￿rst domain is health insurance, where employees can choose from among ￿ve PPO options.6
These options only vary in their ￿nancial coverage, and (with the exception of option 1) are vertically
4As is typical in data sets like ours, we do not observe medical expenditures for employees covered by an HMO or
who opted out of employer-provided coverage. It is also di¢ cult to analyze the choice of either of these two options
since the prices are not known, nor is it entirely clear how to de￿ne the ￿good￿being purchased (or to rank it in
terms of risk exposure).
5Note that the lowest priced option for dental, short-term disability, and long-term disability is free, so that
e⁄ectively there is no ￿opt out￿option for these domains.
6Employees could also choose an HMO or to opt out from health and drug coverage entirely, but those employees
who chose these options are excluded from our baseline sample, for reasons described earleir.
5rankable,7 with the deductible level being the key di⁄erence.8 Option 1 stipulates a high annual
deductible of 3,000 dollars (for non-single coverage), while option 5 stipulates no deductible. Slightly
over half of the employees choose the safest option (option 5), about one quarter choose the second
safest option, and about 17 percent choose the least safe option (option 1).
The second domain covers prescription drug coverage, and employees are o⁄ered three options
that vary in their cost sharing for branded drugs, from 30 percent to 50 percent cost sharing for
retail branded drugs (deductible and coverage of generics are the same across options). Almost two
thirds choose the safest option and one-quarter choose the least safe option.
The third domain is dental coverage, which o⁄ers two options that primarily vary in their
annual maximum bene￿t, of 1,000 vs. 2,000 dollars. About 70 percent of employees choose the
safest option.
The fourth and ￿fth domains are short-term and long-term disability insurance. Short-term
disability insurance covers disability-related lost earnings of durations up to six months, while
long-term disability insurance covers (less frequent) longer durations. Employees are given a choice
of 3 options for each disability insurance coverage, with the replacement rate varying across options.
Unlike the ￿rst three domains, the pricing and bene￿ts associated with disability insurance are not
given in absolute dollars, but rather are proportional to the employee￿ s annual wage. Thus, the
up-front premiums each employee faces vary based on his or her wage, and the bene￿ts are given
as ￿(wage) replacement rates￿that are typically 60% and 50% (for short- and long-term coverage,
respectively) for the least coverage option and 100% and 70% (respectively) for the options that
o⁄er most coverage. About two thirds of the employees choose the highest replacement rate for
each option. In each domain, the remaining employees are roughly equally split between the two
lower replacement rate options.
The sixth and ￿nal domain is the 401(k) asset allocation. As is common in many ￿rms, Al-
coa employees are encouraged to contribute every pay-period to their 401(k) account, with Alcoa
matching such contributions up to 6%. In our analysis we abstract from the employees￿decisions
as to whether and how much to contribute, but rather focus on how contributing employees choose
7The exception is the cheapest health insurance option (option 1), which is set up as a Health Reimbursement
Account (HRA) in which Alcoa contributes each year $1,250 in tax free money that the employee can used to fund
eligible out-of-pocket health care expenses. Any balance remaining at the end of the year can be rolled over to pay
for future out-of-pocket costs (as long at the employee remains enrolled in this plan). At retirement (or severance)
remaining balances can be used to pay for Alcoa-sponsored retiree health care plan premiums (or toward elected
COBRA coverage). Since the ￿nancial tax bene￿ts associated with an HRA vary across individuals (based on their
marginal tax rates, their expectation regarding future employment with Alcoa, and so on), this introduces a non-
vertical component to the health insurance choice. We verify that all the results we report below remain qualitatively
similar when we omit the set of individuals who chose this option, but since this set is quite large our preferred
speci￿cation and analysis simply ignores the tax bene￿ts associated with the HRA.
8While there is additional variation across plans in the out-of-pocket maximum and corresponding coverage details
of out-of-network expenditure, individuals rarely (less than one percent) reach this out-of-pocket maximum, and only
infrequently (less than ￿ve percent) use out-of-network services. The out-of-pocket maximum also allows us to
abstract from tail risk, which is covered by all options similarly, up to the very similar out-of-pocket maximum across
options.
6to allocate their contributions across assets. All employees can allocate their contributions and
balances among 13 di⁄erent funds that are available to them, and in principle are allowed to con-
tinuously adjust these allocations (although they infrequently do so; for example, only one-quarter
of our sample changes its asset allocation during 2004). The funds vary in their riskiness (see
Appendix Table A2). To simplify the analysis, we focus on the employees￿decisions as to what
fraction of their contributions they allocate to the two risk-free funds during 2004.9 About two
￿fths of employees allocate none of these contributions to the risk free funds, and about 17% of
employees allocate all of their contributions to the risk free funds.
Although describing the options and outcomes in each domain is useful, our understanding
of the choices is perhaps best guided by the incremental trade-o⁄s associated with each choice.
Columns (2) through (4) of Table 2 provide two (rough) attempts to quantify the relative risk
exposure associated with the di⁄erent choices within a domain. Column (2) does this by reporting
the average incremental premium saving in the sample from choosing a given option relative to the
least risk exposure option. Columns (3) and (4) report, respectively, the expected and standard
deviation of the incremental costs that the employee would face (counterfactually for most of the
sample) with the option shown relative to the safest option, if he were to be randomly drawn
from our baseline sample. These incremental costs are calculated based on the coverage details
and the distribution of realized claims.10 The most interesting point we take away from Table 2 is
that the incremental decisions across each domain are quite comparable in their magnitude, with
additional premiums (and associated bene￿ts) ranging from several hundred to a few thousand
dollars, annually.
Attractions of our setting. The data and setting o⁄er several key attractive features for inves-
tigating the extent to which individuals display a common ranking in their risk aversion relative
to their peers across domains. First, within all domains, the di⁄erences across di⁄erent choices are
purely in the amount of ￿nancial risk exposure. They do not involve, for example, di⁄erences in ac-
cess restrictions to health care providers or di⁄erent service quality by asset fund managers. Such
di⁄erences would have introduced additional domain-speci￿c elements of the choices that would
make interpretation of the results more di¢ cult. Relatedly, since the choices within a domain dif-
fer only in the amount of ￿nancial risk exposure, they can each be collapsed to a unidimensional
vertical ranking of the amount of ￿nancial risk one is exposed to in di⁄erent choices. This makes
9These two funds are not totally risk free, but they are marketed to employees as the least risky funds, and
the standard deviation of their (monthly) returns (0.02 and 0.83) is much smaller than that of the other investment
options (which range from 1.36 to 6.71). The results remain similar if we de￿ne only the fund with the lowest standard
deviation as the risk free allocation, which is not surprising given that the lowest standard deviation fund receives
25% of 401(k) asset allocations, compared to only 4% for the second lowest standard deviation fund. See Appendix
Table A2 for more detail.
10In our data, expected incremental costs (column (3)) are sometimes higher than incremental premiums (column
(2)) suggesting (contrary to fact) that all weakly risk averse individuals will buy the safest option. This is at least
partially due to our (unrealistic) simplifying assumption (for the construction of this table) that all individuals are
drawn from the same risk distribution.
7it relatively straightforward to assess how much more likely it is for individuals who assume more
vs. less risk compared to their peers in one domain to assume more vs. less risk in another domain
compared to their peers.
Second, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, all of the domains are plausibly valuable
and sensible insurance from an economic standpoint. That is, they all represent potentially large
expenditures with real ex ante uncertainty to the individual. For example, the coe¢ cient of variation
of incremental costs (computed based on columns (3) and (4)) is always greater than one third,
and mostly greater than one. This is a much more appealing setting for studying the extent to
which choices across domains display a common risk aversion component than looking at settings in
which it is unclear why individuals are buying insurance in the ￿rst instance, such as insurance for
internal wiring protection (as in, e.g., Cicchetti and Dubin, 1994) and other types of ￿insurance￿
products that cover against very small losses, which Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue is where people
are perhaps most likely to depart from expected utility theory.
Third, as discussed earlier (and shown in Table 2, columns (2) and (3)), the choices within a
domain are over similarly sized risks, making our analysis less vulnerable to Rabin￿ s critique of
expected utility theory (Rabin, 2000).
Fourth, many of the bene￿t options are entirely new in 2004, which means that for these bene￿t
options we are looking at decisions made all at the same time period and do not have to worry
about ￿stale￿ decisions in some domains re￿ ecting a combination of inertia and outdated risk
preferences. Speci￿cally, the health, drug and dental options were all completely new, while the
disability options remained the same but their prices changed; the 401(k) options did not change.11
As a further check against the possibility of ￿stale￿decisions (particularly for 401(k) allocations
and potentially disability choices), we show in our robustness analysis that the main results look
similar when restricted to a sample of new hires, for whom decisions in all six domains had to be
made recently.
Fifth, and relatedly, with the exception of the 401(k) asset allocation decisions, the nature of
the employee bene￿t selections eliminates many potential domain-speci￿c elements of the choice;
all the insurance bene￿ts are presented in the same format (all on the same bene￿t worksheet)
and must be chosen during the same open enrollment period. Thus, we do not have to worry for
example about time-varying events, di⁄erential e⁄ort or ability of insurance agents, etc.
Sixth, there is interesting variation across the six domains in the ￿closeness￿of the domains.
In particular, it seems that some domains (such as short-term and long-term disability insurance)
are quite similar while others (such as health insurance and 401(k) decisions) are more di⁄erent.
Therefore it is interesting to see if the extent of correlation in choices within an individual across
domains varies by their relative ￿closeness.￿
11We also know the default options for each domain which are: health insurance option 4, drug insurance option 3
single coverage, and for dental, short- and long-term disability the default is one￿ s prior year￿ s choice if he or she was
previously employed (or no coverage, lowest option, and middle option respectively if they are a new hire). Of course,
people in these allocations may also have chosen them actively. In our robustness analysis we explore sensitivity to
excluding people who, based on their allocations, may not be active choosers.
8Finally, but very importantly, the data are extremely clean and complete. We observe all the
details of the choice set, the choice made, the setting in which the choice is made, a measure of risk
occurrence, and quite rich demographic information.
3 Empirical strategy
A natural way to evaluate the stability of risk preferences across domains is to write down a
model of consumer behavior, use the data and the model to obtain estimates for risk aversion for
each consumer in each domain, and then compare the estimates obtained for the same individual
in di⁄erent domains. However, for relatively disparate domains such as ours, such an exercise
will almost surely be sensitive to the modeling assumptions. For example, health, dental, and
prescription drug insurance are associated with absolute (dollar) costs and distribution of risk,
while disability and investment decisions are driven by risks that are proportional to the employee￿ s
wage and wealth, respectively. More generally, estimating the distribution of risk aversion from
individuals￿ insurance choices requires a domain-speci￿c model of ex-ante heterogeneity in risk
(Cohen and Einav, 2007; Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum, 2009).
Our strategy is therefore to avoid most of these modeling assumptions by focusing on the
within-person correlation in the ordinal ranking of the riskiness of the choice an individual makes
across di⁄erent domains. In other words, we ask whether individuals who appear to be more
willing to bear risk than their peers in one context are also more willing to bear risk in another
context. Admittedly, this is a more modest test of the stability of risk preferences. For example,
we could ￿nd that individuals are stable in their relative ranking, although the entire distribution
of willingness to assume risk is dramatically di⁄erent across domains (but rank preserving). The
advantage of this approach, however, is that it allows us to make inferences that are much more
robust to various di¢ cult-to-test modeling assumptions. In particular, the approach ￿only￿requires
that any unobserved individual- and domain-speci￿c components of demand in a given domain are
rank preserving; it does not require us, for example, to take a stand on the nature of the utility
function (e.g. constant absolute vs. constant relative risk aversion) or a model by which we can
map the distribution of ex-post claims experience into ex-ante private information about risk type.
Quantifying vs. testing Our primary interest is in developing reasonable benchmarks against
which one could compare and contrast our estimates of the correlation in the ordinal ranking of the
riskiness of one￿ s choices across domains. For reasons both of interest and practicality, we focus on
ways of quantifying and interpreting the magnitude of our estimates rather than testing the two
possible extreme nulls. At one possible extreme of our analysis (which for lack of a better term
we would call the ￿neoclassical￿ model), the rank correlations would be one and (relative) risk
preferences would be ￿fully￿domain general. In the other extreme (which for lack of a better term
we would call the ￿narrow framing￿model) we assume that there is no domain-general component
to preferences, so one￿ s risk aversion in one domain has no predictive power for how one makes
choices in another domain, and the correlation would be zero. As noted earlier, we ￿nd neither of
9these extreme hypotheses particularly compelling as representations of reality, which serves as part
of our motivation to focus on quantifying the extent of domain generality rather than testing either
extreme null.
Relatedly, a robust test of the null of full domain generality is elusive, since even if preferences
are fully domain general, the rank correlation need not be one. For example, even if risk preferences
are fully domain general, any discreteness and non-linearity in the function that maps risk aversion
to choices would make the correlation estimates lower, potentially by a substantial amount. To
illustrate this with a concrete example, suppose we observe N individuals making choices in two
domains (j and k), each of which o⁄ers two discrete choices, with choice 1 exposing the individual
to more risk than choice 2: Even if preferences are fully domain general, it is possible that due to
the di⁄erent pricing of options in the two di⁄erent domains, in domain j the lowest risk aversion
individual chooses option 1 while all N ￿1 other individuals choose option 2, while in domain k the
highest risk aversion individual chooses option 2 and all N ￿ 1 other individuals choose option 1.
While this allocation is consistent with the underlying model of fully domain general preferences,
the correlation of choices across the two domains will approach zero as N gets su¢ ciently large.
In addition, in a fully domain general model with a single utility function over wealth, insurance
decisions are inter-related, and one essentially chooses a portfolio of insurance positions. In other
words, risk exposure in one domain may a⁄ect (with ex ante ambiguous sign) one￿ s willingness to
bear risk in another (even independent) domain (e.g., Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese, 1996). This so-called ￿background risk￿ problem introduces yet another reason why
fully domain general preferences need not produce a rank correlation of one across domains.
Thus, testing for a correlation of one ￿or comparing the estimated correlations against a fully
domain general benchmark of one ￿is not, we would argue, meaningful or appropriate. In the next
section we o⁄er several alternative possible benchmarks that can help inform the extent of domain
generality. By contrast, rejecting the null of a zero correlation is a more meaningful rejection of
the null of no domain-general component to preferences. Of course, it is subject to the concern
that non-preference factors may introduce correlations across domains. In the case of insurance
a natural suspect is potential correlation in risks across domains, which is why we consider the
correlation between 401(k) asset allocations and any given insurance choice as the cleanest test of
this null.
Econometric speci￿cation Given our interest in the extent to which individuals￿ranking in
their risk aversion relative to their peers displays a common component across domains, a natural
empirical approach is to examine the rank correlation within individuals across domains in their
choice from among the (vertically ranked) options in a domain. We therefore begin by reporting
pairwise Spearman rank correlations across domains. A disadvantage to this approach, however,
is that it does not readily lend itself to controlling for potentially important covariates nor does it
lend itself as easily to a construction of comparative benchmarks with which to gauge the relative
importance of the domain general component of risk preferences that we detect.
We therefore also examine the correlation structure of the error terms in a multivariate regression















































































where xi is a vector of control variables (which is the same in all regressions), ￿ is a vector of
domain-speci￿c coe¢ cients, and the main object of interest is the correlation matrix of the residuals.
In practice, the rank correlations and the correlations from the multivariate regression produce
extremely similar results.
In our baseline speci￿cation we enumerate the choices from 1 to n in each domain (as in Table 2),
and estimate equation (1) using (multivariate) least squares. This speci￿cation has the disadvantage
that it treats an ordinal choice as a cardinal variable. However, since the results are remarkably
similar to those of the Spearman rank correlation (as well as to a system of ordered probit equations
on which we report in the robustness section), we are comfortable using this simpler approach to
explore sensitivity to the choice of control variables (xi) and to provide benchmarks for gauging
the magnitude of the correlations we estimate.
In our baseline multivariate regression speci￿cation we include controls (in the form of dummies)
for the menu of bene￿ts the employee faced (described above). We also explore the sensitivity of our
results to the inclusion of controls that proxy for individual risk in a given domain. Because standard
theory models insurance choices as driven by risk and risk aversion, isolating risk aversion requires
controlling for risk. In doing so, we control for both predictable risk as well as for idiosyncratic risk.
For the latter we use the realization of risks in the subsequent coverage period. For the former, we
use our data to run a predictive statistical model of realized risks on a ￿ exible functional form of
our observables, and then generate the model predictions and use these predictions as controls.12
Interestingly, controlling for risks makes little di⁄erence, so we are not particularly worried about
how much better we might have been able to predict risk with even more ￿ exible speci￿cations.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline correlations
Table 3 presents the main correlation results. Panel A shows the full set of Spearman rank correla-
tion coe¢ cients between each pair of domains. It also reports (at the bottom) the simple average
of the ￿fteen correlation, as a single summary measure. Panel B shows the correlations from the
baseline multivariate regression described above in equation (1). The results are remarkably similar
12Speci￿cally, risk is predicted by regressing realized risk on cubic splines in age, wage, and job tenure, dummy
variables for gender, race, emplyee type (hourly or salary), union status, single coverage for health bene￿ts, family
size, state ￿xed e⁄ects, and interaction between age and these dummy variables.
11across the two panels which is why (as discussed above) we use the multivariate regression in Panel
B as our baseline speci￿cation.
In all of the pairs, we can reject the null hypothesis of a correlation of 0. That is, we can
reject the null of no domain general component of choice. Viewed alternatively, we ￿nd that one￿ s
coverage choice in every other domain has some predictive power for his or her choice in a given
domain.
Of course, an important caveat to this conclusion is that correlations in choices across insurance
domains could re￿ ect correlation in underlying (unpriced) risk across the insurance domains; such
an issue does not arise in the context of the correlation between 401(k) portfolio allocation and
choices in an insurance domain, making this perhaps the most compelling context to test the null
of complete domain speci￿city. To try to address the concern about underlying risk correlations
across insurance domains, Panel C of Table 3 reports the results from a variant of the baseline
multivariate regression in which we control (as explained earlier) for both predicted and realized
risk in all domains in each equation. The magnitude of the correlations generally remains almost
the same, with only a slight decline (the decline is to be expected, given that these risks are
positively correlated). While predicted and realized risk do not control perfectly for one￿ s ex ante
risk expectations, the small e⁄ect that these controls have on the correlation pattern suggests that
these correlations are more likely to capture correlation in underlying risk preferences. This is also
consistent with recent results ￿in the context of a fully speci￿ed model ￿that heterogeneity in risk
preferences plays a much greater role than heterogeneity in risks in explaining the heterogeneity in
insurance coverage choices (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum, 2009).
Although the ￿nding that risk preferences are correlated across domains may be viewed as hardly
surprising, we are not aware of any other work that documented it, at least in the context of actual
choices (that is, non-experimental and non-survey), across a broad range of contexts. We believe
this ￿nding provides one of the most compelling evidence against the null of no domain-general
component to choice.
In all three panels of Table 3 we see that the average pairwise correlation is 0.16 to 0.19. Not
surprisingly, there is a pronounced pattern of substantially higher correlation coe¢ cients between
pairs that are more ￿similar.￿For example, in panel B (which we will use as our baseline speci￿ca-
tion), the correlation between drug and health coverage choices is 0.45 and the correlation between
long-term and short-term disability insurance choices is 0.60. By contrast, medical insurance and
short-term disability insurance show only a 0.19 correlation and the lowest pair-wise correlations
are between the share of risk free assets in one￿ s 401(k) portfolio and any of the insurance coverage
choices (all of which are below 0.06). Of course, it is not clear how informative this ￿nding is since
comparisons of correlations between di⁄erent pairs are di¢ cult to interpret due, for example, to
di⁄erences in the discreteness and pricing of the relative options in each domain.
124.2 Benchmarks to help interpretation
While we interpret the results presented in Table 3 as supporting the claim that there exists a
domain general component of risk preferences, as noted at the outset, our primary interest is
in developing useful metrics for gauging the quantitative importance of domain-general element
of preferences that we have detected. As we emphasized in Section 3, comparing the estimated
correlations to the benchmark of a correlation of 1 does not provide a meaningful assessment of
the extent of domain generality of preferences, as the correlation in choices may be substantially
less than 1 even if preferences are fully domain general.13 In this section we therefore suggest
three potentially useful metrics for gauging the extent of domain general preferences implied by the
correlation estimates in Table 3. Our general conclusion from these benchmarks is that, contrary to
our expectations, the reported average correlations of 0.16-0.19 are in fact quite high, and suggestive
of an important domain-general component of risk preferences.
Simulated correlations from a calibrated model. One natural way of gauging the magnitude
of our estimated correlation coe¢ cients is to compare them to the correlation coe¢ cients that
would arise from a calibrated model of coverage choice. The objective of the calibration exercise is
to obtain some benchmarks for the correlation coe¢ cients between choices generated by a model
with completely domain-general risk preferences, but subject to the non-linearities and discreteness
transformations that arise because of the structure of the insurance options, and the decision
process.
We use the short-term and long-term disability insurance settings and simulate optimal cov-
erage choices from among three options similar to those described in Table 2. We choose these
two domains because their similarity allows us to use the same modeling assumptions in both. We
assume an expected utility model with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), we calibrate the
distribution of risk aversion, and use the claims data to de￿ne eight risk groups based on demo-
graphics. We then simulate coverage choices from the modal menu in both these domains and
calculate the correlation in coverage choices using di⁄erent assumptions about the correlation in
risk. We also compute correlations between the short term disability insurance coverage choice and
the underlying coe¢ cient of risk aversion; this correlation is conceptually similar to the correlation
between the discrete insurance coverage choices in our data and the continuous measure we use to
capture risk aversion in the 401(k) setting. The appendix describes these exercises in more detail.
The correlations we obtain in the ￿rst exercise, across short term disability insurance and
long term disability insurance vary between 0.18 (when we assume that the individual risk group is
independent across the two choices) and 0.55 (when we assume the risk groups are the same). When
13Relatedly, one might think that a natural way to gauge the extent of domain general preferences is via factor
analysis. Greater domain generality would imply greater importance of the ￿rst factor relative to the incremental
importance of additional factors. We performed a principal components analysis and found that the ￿rst factor
explains 35 percent of the observed variation in the six domains, compared to only 20 percent for the next most
important factor. We note, however, that such analysis raises the same di¢ culties for interpretation; without proper
benchmarks it is hard to evaluate whether 35 percent is high or low.
13we control for risk (using risk group ￿xed e⁄ects) the latter correlation drops to 0.47. One could
think of comparing these numbers to the correlation we report between short-term and long-term
disability coverage of around 0.6. We have also experimented with correlating simulated choices
from two di⁄erent menus of the same coverage (of short-term disability insurance); this exercise
allowed us to assume identical risks across the choices (as the domain is the same), and even in
such cases the correlation in choices remained below 0.79, and dropped to 0.50 after controlling for
risk group ￿xed e⁄ects. We view this qualitative analysis as suggesting that a correlation of 0.6 is
quite high.14
Finally, the correlation we obtain between the choice from the discrete short term disability
insurance menu and the underlying risk aversion coe¢ cient is 0.14. This may be compared to the
much smaller correlations we empirically ￿nd between the discrete insurance choices and the contin-
uous 401(k) asset allocation. This is consistent with our earlier interpretation that the correlation
between 401(k) and the insurance choices is indeed quite low if one has in mind a model with fully
domain-general risk preferences.
Predictive power of covariates. Another way of gauging the importance of the domain general
element of preferences is by comparing the predictive power of choices in other domains to the
predictive power of demographic covariates. Table 4 reports these results. For each domain, it
reports the adjusted R2 from a multivariate regression of the (ordinal) coverage choice in this
domain on di⁄erent subsets of covariates. All regressions are done on the residual coverage choice
(after partialing out the menu ￿xed e⁄ects). As one can see, the explanatory power (measured
by the adjusted R2) of the choices in other domains (row 1) is much greater for predicting one￿ s
insurance choice in a di⁄erent domain than the predictive power of one￿ s risk type (row 2), or one￿ s
detailed demographics (row 3). For example, the predictive power of choices in other domains is
at least four times greater than the predictive power of demographics in predicting the choice in
a given insurance domain. Even when we limit the choices in other domains to exclude the most
related coverage choice (row 4), the predictive power of the remaining choices is at least 1.5 times
higher than that of demographics for the choice in a given insurance domain.
The case of 401(k) is a noted exception to this pattern. The explanatory power of the insurance
choices (row 1) is an order of magnitude lower than that of demographics. This is not a particularly
surprising pattern, given the relative ￿distance￿between 401(k) and all the other choices, as well as
potential di⁄erences in the timing (or framing) of the decision, and potential age-based preferences
for the (longer horizon) 401(k) investments.
Within person correlation for the same domain over time. Yet another natural benchmark
for gauging the extent of domain general preferences is to compare the correlation within person
in choices across domains at a point in time to the correlation within person in choices in a given
14This exercise was also reassuring that ￿despite the discrete choice set ￿the null of no domain general preferences
manifests itself to essentially zero correlation when we assume independent risk aversion (and independent risk groups)
across domains.
14domain over time. Here again we can take advantage of the new bene￿t design that Alcoa introduced
in 2004, and compute the correlation for health insurance choices between 2003 and 2004. In the
￿old￿bene￿t design (of 2003), individuals could choose from among three di⁄erent coverage options
(compared to ￿ve in the new design), with variation in out-of-pocket maximum being binding and
important. These three options were also vertically rankable from least to most coverage, just
like other domains in 2004, thus providing a similar structure, and a comparable benchmark. The
correlation we ￿nd between health insurance choices (of the same employee) in 2003 and 2004 is
0.198. This is similar to (or smaller than) the across-insurance-domain correlations reported in
Table 3 which range from 0.16 to 0.60.15
4.3 Correlations for di⁄erent groups
In addition to exploring the extent of domain general preferences for the entire sample, we also
examined how this varies across di⁄erent identi￿able groups. We report the main results in Table
5, which shows selected correlations for di⁄erent pairs of groups of employees. While many pairwise
correlations seem to be quite similar across groups, the most striking pattern in Table 5 is in column
(5), which shows the pattern across groups in the correlation between health insurance coverage
choices and 401(k) allocation decisions. A similar pattern is observed across these groups in the
correlations between other insurance choices and the 401(k) decisions (not shown in the table in
the interest of space).
Quite remarkably, the results in column (5) reveal a consistent pattern that individuals whom
one might ex ante classify as likely to make better ￿nancial decisions tend to have noticeably
higher correlations between health insurance choices and 401(k) decisions. This is true for older
individuals relative to younger individuals, for individuals with longer tenure with Alcoa (who
perhaps understand the ￿system￿better), individuals with higher wages, and individuals who tend
to avoid what economists often view as unsophisticated ￿nancial behavior, such as not rebalancing
the portfolio regularly and allocating some of their contributions to Alcoa stock.
One way to interpret these ￿ndings is that while the correlation between insurance and 401(k)
investment choices is low in the overall sample, we ￿nd a greater degree of domain-general risk
aversion once we focus on individuals who exhibit more ￿￿nancial literacy,￿ or at least seem to
pay more attention to their investment decisions. An alternative, plausible interpretation is that
these results suggest less error in the mapping from ￿true￿underlying risk preferences to choices
for individuals who appear to be more ￿￿nancially literate.￿This latter interpretation is consistent
with a growing body of empirical work suggesting that the propensity to succumb to psychological
biases or to make mistakes in ￿nancial planning is higher for individuals of lower cognitive ability
(Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro 2006) and for individuals of lower ￿nancial literacy or planning
propensity (Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Either interpretation
15One could also investigate correlation in choices over time without any change in bene￿t design. The concern
about such an exercise is that employees don￿ t make ￿active￿ choices in subsequent years, which is precisely the
reason that made us use the new bene￿t design for the baseline exercise. Indeed, when we exmaine such correlatoins
(looking at years 2004 and 2005), we obtain correlation coe¢ cients of 0.85-0.9, presumably due to inertia.
15suggests that one might want to exercise more caution in using speci￿c revealed preference estimates
to calibrate risk aversion levels in economic models, when they are applied to less sophisticated
populations.
Finally, in a di⁄erent vein, we note a reassuring result in Table 5 that there is no evidence
of higher correlations for the newly hired than for more tenured employees, either in general or
particularly for the correlation between health insurance choices and 401(k) decisions. This is
reassuring since it alleviates concerns that health insurance might re￿ ect a ￿new￿ or ￿active￿
choice while the 401(k) asset allocation decisions might re￿ ect inertial behavior.
4.4 Robustness
We explored the robustness of our main correlation results (in Table 3) to various alternative
speci￿cations and samples. Table 6 summarizes the results of these analyses. As in Table 5, in
the interest of space, we do not report every pairwise correlation, but instead report the average
correlation and the correlations of three representative (and interesting) pairs. We explore two main
types of sensitivity analysis: alternative speci￿cations and alternative samples. Unless otherwise
speci￿ed, each row represents a single variant from the baseline speci￿cation. Overall, the results
suggest relatively little sensitivity to these choices.
Row 1 shows our baseline speci￿cation from Panel B of Table 3. This reports the correlation
of the residuals from the multivariate regression given in equation (1); the control variables in this
baseline speci￿cation are the bene￿t menu ￿xed e⁄ects. We previously showed that the results were
robust to using the Spearman rank correlation without any control variables (Panel A of Table 3)
or to adding additional control variables for risk type to the baseline speci￿cation (Panel C of Table
3). Panel A of Table 6 further investigates the sensitivity of the results to alternative speci￿cations.
Row 2 reports the correlations of residuals from estimating a mixed system of ordered probits
for the ￿ve insurance domains (rather than linear regression models in the baseline speci￿cation)
and a linear model for the 401(k) domain. This more appropriately re￿ ects the ordinal nature of
the dependent variables in the insurance domains.16 Row 3 reports results from a variant of our
baseline speci￿cation in which we discretize the 401(k) asset allocation decision and turn it into
an ordinal measure, so as to investigate the extent to which the relatively low correlation between
401(k) and insurance domains is a⁄ected by the continuous, cardinal nature of the 401(k) domain.
Speci￿cally, we take the continuous measure of the percentage of employee contributions allocated
to the safe funds, and convert it to a discrete integer between 1 to 5, with each corresponding to a
20% bin from riskiest to safest (1 corresponds to 0-20% in risk free assets, 2 corresponds to 20-40%,
and so on). In row 4 we investigate the sensitivity of our results to including indicator variables
for the (four) coverage tiers (single coverage, employee plus spouse, employee plus children, and
16We estimate this mixed multi-equation model using maximum likelihood. The estimation is performed using the
cmp user-provided package in STATA (see: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456882.html). All the regressions
include pricing menu ￿xed e⁄ects, and we exclude all the menus that were o⁄ered to fewer than 100 people. This
reduces the sample size by 86 employees.
16family coverage). Finally, to investigate concerns about whether our bene￿t menu ￿xed e⁄ects fully
capture di⁄erences in choices due to prices, in row 5 we limit the sample to those who faced the
prices in the single largest menu (about 60 percent of our baseline sample) and re-estimate our
baseline speci￿cation (without the menu ￿xed e⁄ects) on this subsample.
Panel B of Table 6 explores the sensitivity of our baseline speci￿cation to alternative sample
de￿nitions. In rows 6 through 8 we add back in various employees who were excluded from the
baseline sample. In row 6 we include those employees who opted out of the health insurance and
drug insurance plans, or who chose an HMO for these plans. In row 7 we include employees who
did not contribute to their 401(k) plan in 2004, and in row 8 we include those employees who were
not o⁄ered long-term disability insurance. In each case, we omit from the analysis the a⁄ected
domains (health and drug in row 6, 401(k) in row 7, and long-term disability in row 8). As a result,
comparison of the average correlation to that in the baseline may be misleading, but the pairwise
ones are still informative, and we also report the comparable average correlation in the baseline
speci￿cation. In row 9 we exclude from our analysis individuals who chose health insurance option
1, the lowest coverage option, which, because it is bundled with a Health Retirement Account
component, is not fully vertically rankable (see Appendix Table A1 and discussion in text above).
In row 10 we limit the sample to the slightly under 10 percent of the sample who were new hires
in 2004. As discussed earlier, a primary motivation for this analysis is to see if 401(k) contribution
allocations are more highly correlated with insurance choices when the 401(k) choice (like the
insurance choice) must be a new and ￿active￿ decision. In practice, there is no evidence that
di⁄erences in timing of the decision is driving down the correlation between 401(k) asset allocation
and insurance coverage. Finally, in row 11 we exclude the roughly 11 percent of individuals who
might have been ￿passive￿choosers, given that all their coverage decisions in the insurance domains
were consistent with the default options.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the extent to which individuals display a stable ranking in their risk
preferences relative to their peers in making choices over di⁄erent ￿nancial lotteries. In contrast
to much of the prior work on this topic we have focused on real-world choices as opposed to
hypothetical questions, laboratory experiments, or self-reported behaviors. We have also chosen to
follow an empirical strategy which investigates to what extent individuals￿willingness to take risks
relative to their peers is stable across domains, rather than to attempt to test the null of completely
domain general preferences. While our chosen approach sets a lower hurdle for a canonical domain-
general risk aversion theory to pass, it also relies more on the data and less on modeling assumptions,
making it more robust. An important portion of the paper has tried to develop useful benchmarks
which would allow us to gauge the magnitude of any domain-general component of preferences.
We performed our analysis in the context of the workplace-based bene￿t choices of Alcoa em-
ployees regarding their 401(k) asset allocations, their short- and long-term disability insurance, and
their health, drug, and dental insurance choices. This setting has the attraction that the decisions
17are all over purely ￿nancial risk, the choices within each domain are easily vertically rankable in
terms of risk exposure, and the domains involve risks of similar (and quantitatively non trivial)
magnitudes. In this setting, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no domain general component
to preferences and, more interestingly, we ￿nd that the extent of the domain-general component
appears to be substantively important. For example, we ￿nd that the correlations we document are
similar in magnitude to those that would occur from simulated choices in a calibrated model that
subjects individuals to the same options we observe in the data; we also ￿nd that one￿ s choices in
other insurance domains have about four times more predictive power for one￿ s choice in a given
insurance domain than do a rich set of demographic variables.
On the other hand, we also ￿nd evidence of non-trivial context speci￿city. In particular, we ￿nd
that the riskiness of one￿ s 401(k) asset allocation decisions has considerably less predictive power
for one￿ s insurance choices than do other insurance choices (or demographics). More generally, even
within the insurance domains we ￿nd a higher correlation in choices that are ￿closer￿in context
(such as health insurance and drug insurance, or short-term and long-term disability insurance)
than ones that are further apart (such as health insurance and disability insurance).
An implication of these ￿ndings is that when calibrating models of economic behavior ￿be it
insurance demand, savings, labor supply, etc. ￿it may be important to try to calibrate the model
using preference estimates taken from similar contexts. Calibration work is ubiquitous in the ￿elds
of insurance, public ￿nance, and macroeconomics. To our knowledge, the vast majority of this
work (including our own past work) attempts to calibrate the models using ￿consensus￿parameter
estimates (or ranges of estimates) from ￿the literature at large￿rather than estimates from more
similar contexts.
Relatedly, our ￿ndings suggest that the extent of domain-generality of preferences may be
systematically higher for certain types of individuals ￿including wealthier individuals, older in-
dividuals, more ￿nancially sophisticated individuals ￿than others. This suggests that the use of
a domain-general preference parameter in calibration work may be a more reasonable assumption
for certain types of populations. The question of what contexts and for what types of individuals
domain-speci￿city is largest remains an interesting question for further exploration.
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20Appendix: Description of the calibration exercise
The objective of the calibration exercise is to obtain a benchmark for the correlation coe¢ cients that would
be produced if the data were generated by a model with completely domain-general risk preferences, but were
subject to the non-linearities and discreteness transformations that arise from the ordinal coverage choice
data. We focus on short- and long-term disability, which are the domains that are most similar to each other
in their structure of choices and risks (so we can rely on a single choice model for both domains, rather
than on a domain-speci￿c model, which is not ideal). We estimate the correlation in the simulated choices
between the modal short-term disability menu (of 60%, 80% and 100% replacement rates) and the modal
long-term disability menu (of 50%, 60% and 70% replacement rates), using the observed prices. In the text
we also report correlation results between the short-term disability choices and the underlying (continuously
distributed) risk aversion parameter, as well as between short-term disability choices from two di⁄erent
menus (the other being 40%, 50%, and 60% replacement rates).
Our calibration exercise assumes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) per-period utility function,
whereby the expected utility from a given disability insurance contract (which speci￿es a given wage replace-
ment rate and is associated with a given annual premium) is
Eu(c) = E
￿￿
1 ￿ ~ d + replacement_rate ￿ e d ￿ premium
￿1￿￿￿
; (2)
where e d is the (ex-ante random) fraction of days in a year the employee claims (due to disability), the
premium is measured per dollar of (annual) wage, and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The
individual is maximizing expected utility over the duration under consideration, which we assume to be one
year for short-term disability and four years for long-term disability (as after about four years, our claim
data is truncated, although only few disability claims in the data remain active that long). We assume a
discount factor of .95 for long-term disability.
We assume the distribution of ￿ in the population to be lognormal with parameters ￿ = ￿1:2089 and
￿ = 2:1483. This parameters were chosen to produce an average relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3 (as
often used in the literature) and a coe¢ cient of variation of risk aversion of 10, which matches the estimates
reported by Cohen and Einav (2007). We note that while Cohen and Einav (2007) mention higher numbers
of relative risk aversion, they essentially estimate absolute risk aversion, so mapping it this lower level of
relative risk aversion amounts to simply assuming lower relevant wealth.17 To calibrate the distribution of
risk (missed days), we use the risk realization of short- and long-term disability in the data to de￿ne eight risk
groups based on demographics (using all combinations of gender, race, and employment status indicators),
which produces a fairly large heterogeneity in ex ante risk across individuals. We assume a sample size
identical to our baseline sample (12,752) and for each individual in the calibrated sample we draw a risk
aversion coe¢ cient from the distribution of ￿, assume that he or she knows the distribution of risks for his
or her risk group, and compute the optimal coverage choice from the o⁄ered menus of short- and long-term
disability coverage.
17Fortunately in this regard, the simulated correlations remain about the same when we increase risk
aversion by a factor of 10 (maintaing the same coe¢ cient of variation). The correlation drops somewhat
when risk aversion is decreased by a factor of 10, thus making the qualitative results we report fairly robust
to the calibrated level of relative risk aversion.
21Using this model we simulated choices from the modal short- and long-term disability menus o⁄ered in
the data, and correlated these choices with each other and with the underlying (simulated and therefore
known) coe¢ cient of risk aversion.
22Table 1: Employee characteristics in baseline sample
Mean Std. Dev. 5th pctile 95th pctile
Panel A: Demographics
Age 43.9 9.2 28 58
Annual wage (000$) 58.4 71.7 25.6 114
Job tenure with Alcoa (years) 13.2 9.6 1 30
Female 0.23
White 0.85




Number of covered individuals per employee
a 2.92 1.46 1 5
Panel B: Annual Payouts by domain
Health insurance claims ($) 5,221.4 10,606.8 60.3 18,091.7
Prescription drug insurance claims ($) 1,491.8 2,162.2 0.0 5,507.3
Dental insurance claims ($) 781.3 837.3 0.0 2,443.0
Short-term disability insurance (fraction with any claims)
b 0.061
Long-term disability insurance (fraction with any claims)
c 0.002
Annual 401(k) contribution ($) 4,616.2 3,199.5 709.6 11,225.8
The table is based on the 12,752 employees who constitute our baseline sample.
a The coverage tier and covered individuals are based on the medical coverage choices; we view them as reasonable
proxies for family size and structure.
b Conditional on having a short-term disability claim, the average claim length is 51 days.
c Conditional on having a long-term disability claim, the average claim length in our data is 345. However, the
long-term claim data is truncated at about two years, so 345 should be viewed as a lower bound.








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Insurance
Option 1 17.3% 1,016.6 1,415.6 1,052.4
Option 2 1.3% 747.7 880.0 559.7
Option 3 2.7% 545.3 645.6 380.8
Option 4 26.3% 325.0 350.8 173.4
Option 5 52.4%
Prescription Drug Insurance
Option 1 23.8% 181.2 248.6 385.0
Option 2 9.7% 109.6 124.3 192.5
Option 3 66.4%
Dental Insurance




Option 1 15.5% 165.1 140.2 825.7




Option 1 16.3% 152.4 17.0 395.7




Risk-free 0% 40.6% -- -421.7 514.0
Risk-free 0-25% 19.9% --
Risk-free 25-50% 12.8% --
Risk-free 50-75% 6.5% -- -210.8 257.0
Risk-free 75-100% 3.4% --
Risk-free 100% 16.8% --
All options are shown in the ordinal ranking from more (option 1) to less risk exposure (with the possible exception of
health insurance option 1; see text and Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details). Column (1) shows the fraction who
chose each option in our baseline sample. Column (2) shows the average (in the baseline sample) premium savings
from choosing a given option relative to choosing the safest (least risk exposure) option; these vary across employees
based on bene￿t menu, coverage tier (for health, drug and dental), and wages (for short- and long-term disability).
Columns (3) and (4) show, respectively, the average and standard deviation of the incremental cost that the insurer
would face (counterfactually for most of the sample) in covering our baseline sample of employees, given the realized
spending and coverage tier choices, with the safest option (i.e.. the highest numbered option) relative to the option
shown.
a Short-term and long-term disability bene￿ts (columns (3), and (4)) and premiums (column (2)) are proportional
to the employee￿ s wage.
b For 401(k), columns (3) and (4) report expected incremental dollar payout (and associated standard deviation) for
0% vs. 100% in risk-free asset (￿rst row) and 50% vs. 100% in risk-free asset (second row) assuming the average
annual employee contribution in our baseline sample of $4,616. For the risky investment portfolio, we assumed the
allocation across di⁄erent risky funds observed in the baseline sample, and similarly for the risk free part of the
investment portfolio (see Table A2).
24Table 3: Main results
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.400
Dental 0.242 0.275
STD 0.226 0.210 0.179
LTD 0.180 0.199 0.173 0.593
401(k) 0.057 0.061 0.036 0.029 0.028
(0.002) (0.002)
Average correlation is 0.192
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.452
Dental 0.238 0.267
STD 0.188 0.197 0.169
LTD 0.155 0.191 0.165 0.600
401(k) 0.057 0.056 0.035 0.029 0.018
(0.001) (0.042)
Average correlation is 0.188
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.412
Dental 0.207 0.25
STD 0.155 0.156 0.156
LTD 0.129 0.156 0.153 0.593
401(k) 0.039 0.032 0.026 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.844) (0.817)
Average correlation is 0.164
Panel B: Baseline specification, multivariate regression
Panel C: Multivariate regression, Controlling for predicted and realized risk
Panel A: Spearman rank correlations
The table reports results for our baseline sample of 12,752 employees. Unless reported otherwise in parentheses,
the p-values associated with whether the correlation coe¢ cient is di⁄erent from zero are all less than 0.001. Each
cell reports a pairwise correlation. The average correlation is simply the average of the ￿fteen pairwise correlations
shown, and is provided only as a single summary number. Panel A reports Spearman rank correlations, and Panel
B reports the correlation structure from the multivariate regression shown in equation (1) with control (indicator)
variables for the bene￿t menu the employee faces. Panel C reports the results from another variant of equation (1)
which additionally includes controls for predicted and realized risk in all domains for each equation; see the text for
details on the construction of these risk variables.
25Table 4: Predictive power of di⁄erent variables
Regressors
Health Drug Dental STD LTD 401(k)
Choices in other domains 0.227 0.243 0.102 0.374 0.368 0.004
Predicted and realized risk 0.067 0.106 0.056 0.043 0.023 0.023
Demographics 0.037 0.044 0.025 0.039 0.033 0.043
Choices in less related domains 0.082 0.102 0.077 0.063 0.054 0.004
All of the above 0.245 0.292 0.144 0.394 0.378 0.046
Dependent variable
Each entry in the table reports the adjusted R2 from a separate OLS regression of the dependent variable shown in
the column heading. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the enumerated coverage choice in the domain given
by the column header, after partialing out menu ￿xed e⁄ects. The regressors are given by the row header. ￿Choices
in other domains￿contain the vector of the enumerated choices in all ￿ve other domains. ￿Predicted and realized
risk￿refers to a vector of both predicted and realized risks in all domains (see text for more details on how these are
constructed). ￿Choices in less related domains￿omits the other choice which is most correlated with the dependent
variable (Drug in Health and Health in Drug, Drug in Dental, LTD in STD and STD in LTD, Health in 401(k)).
Demographics consist of age, age squared, dummy variables for gender, race and employee type (hourly or salary),
job tenure in Alcoa, annual wage, and a dummy for single coverage tier (as a proxy for family composition).










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single coverage 2441 0.224 0.532 0.252 0.074
Non single 10311 0.176 0.421 0.167 0.055
More tenured 11708 0.185 0.448 0.184 0.059
Newly hired 1044 0.195 0.472 0.184 0.023
Higher wage 3151 0.178 0.425 0.146 0.072
Lower wage 3173 0.162 0.439 0.174 0.026
Don't allocate to Alcoa Stock 7468 0.193 0.448 0.195 0.073
Allocate to Alcoa stock 5284 0.180 0.456 0.176 0.033
Rebalance 401(k) portfolio 3626 0.186 0.430 0.178 0.079
Don't rebalance 9126 0.188 0.460 0.190 0.049
Over 55 years old 1700 0.167 0.446 0.147 0.061
Under 35 years old 2568 0.199 0.447 0.209 0.031
Salaried employees 8644 0.187 0.442 0.175 0.069








The table reports the correlation coe¢ cients for the subsamples speci￿ed in the row headers. The estimates all use
our baseline speci￿cation (Panel B of Table 3). That is, we report the correlation structure of the error term from
estimating the multivariate regression shown in equation (1) with covariates for bene￿t menu ￿xed e⁄ects. The
average correlation in column (2) is the simple average across the ￿fteen possible pairs of correlations (as in the
bottom of each panel of Table 3), while the other columns report the pairwise correlations for the selected pairs
shown in the column headings. Row 1 divides the sample by single coverage tier for health and drug vs. all other
(non-single) coverage tiers. Row 2 separates out newly hired employees (de￿ned as less than 2 years of tenure) from
higher tenured employees. Row 3 separately examines employees with greater than $72,000 annual wages and less
than $36,000 annual wages (approximately the top and bottom quartiles of wages). Row 4 separates employees who
did and did not allocate their own 401(k) contributions to Alcoa stock. Row 5 separates employees who did and did











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Baseline specification 12,752 0.188 0.452 0.188 0.057
A. Alternative specifications
2 A system of ordered probits 12,666 0.264 0.550 0.292 0.055
3 Discretizing the 401(k) choice 12,752 0.189 0.452 0.188 0.058
4 Control for coverage tier 12,752 0.186 0.447 0.187 0.058
5 Use only the largest pricing menu 7,722 0.195 0.452 0.191 0.069
B. Alternative samples
6 Include those in opt-out and HMO 15,409 0.165
a -- -- --
7 Include employees who did not contribute to 401(k) 15,402 0.257
b 0.446 0.184 --
8 Include those not offered LTD coverage 15,675 0.162
c 0.442 0.183 0.052
9 Exclude those in Health Option 1 (due to HRA component) 10,547 0.147 0.226 0.175 0.009
10 Include only new hires 1,044 0.195 0.472 0.184 0.023
11 Exclude individuals who may have chosen default options 11,323 0.191 0.460 0.197 0.059
This table reports correlation results for variants of the baseline speci￿cation. Column (2) shows the simple average
of the 15 pairwise correlations, and columns (3) through (5) report correlations for speci￿c pairs. Row 1 replicates
the baseline speci￿cation (as in Table 3, Panel B) which reports the correlation coe¢ cients of the error term from
the multivariate regression shown in equation (1), including bene￿t menu ￿xed e⁄ects. All rows except row 5 include
these bene￿t menu ￿xed e⁄ects. Row 2 estimates a system of ￿ve ordered probits and one linear regression (for the
401(k) domain) rather than the multivariate regression shown in equation (1) (see text for more details). Row 3
replaces the continuous 401(k) riskiness measure with a discretized ordinal measure of 1-5, for each 20% interval of
allocations in safe assets. Row 4 includes coverage tier (based on health coverage) ￿xed e⁄ects, and row 5 reports
results using the largest (modal) bene￿t menu (and therefore no menu ￿xed e⁄ects). Rows 6-11 report results from
alternative samples. In rows 6, 7, and 8 we include employees that were excluded from the baseline sample, and
in these cases we omit the domain that had disquali￿ed these employees from the baseline sample. Therefore the
average correlations in these cases are not directly comparable to the baseline speci￿cation, although the individual
pairs are. In row 10 we limit the sample to new hires (de￿ned as job tenure at Alcoa of less than two years). In row
11 we exclude the approximately 10% of the employees whose choices are fully consistent with the default options in
all insurance domains, and are therefore potentially ￿passive￿choosers.
a The comparable average correlation (that is, over the 6 pairs that do not include health and drug coverage) in the
baseline speci￿cation is 0.169.
b The analogous average correlation (that is, over the 10 pairs that do not include 401(k) choices) in the baseline
speci￿cation is 0.262.
c The analogous average correlation (that is, over the 10 pairs that do not include long-term disability coverage) in
the baseline speci￿cation is 0.169.
28Table A1: Coverage Details for Insurance Plans
Summary of Key Coverage Details Additional details
(1) (2)
Health Insurance
a Deductible (In-network / out-of-network)
Option 1
b 3,000 /  6,000
Option 2 1,500 /  3,000
Option 3 1,000 /  2,000
Option 4 500 /  1,000
Option 5 0 /  500
Prescription Drug Insurance Cost sharing for branded drugs (retail / mail order)
Option 1 50%  /  40%
Option 2 40%  /  30%
Option 3 30% / 20%
Dental Insurance Per person Deductible / Maximum annual benefit
Option 1 50  /  1000
Option 2 25  /  2000
Short-Term Disability Insurance
c Wage replacement rate
Option 1 mostly 60% (sometimes 40%)
Option 2 mostly 80% (sometimes 60%)
Option 3 mostly 100% (sometimes 80%)
Long-Term Disability Insurance
c Replacement rate
Option 1 mostly 50%
Option 2 mostly 60%
Option 3 mostly 70%
After satisfying the annual deductible, cost sharing is 10% in-network and 30% out-of-network
for all options. All options also specify in-network and out-of-network out-of-pocket
maximums, but these are rarely binding. Preventive care is covered in full under all coverage
options.
Salary workers have 100% replacement rate for first two weeks of disability under all options;
all options provide up to 26 weeks of benefits.
All long-term disability coverage is payable after 26 weeks of disability (when the shirt-term
disability coverage is capped).
The family deductible is double the per-person amount. Both plans fully cover preventative
care, provide identical coverage for other special treatments. Oral surgery is covered at 50%
under option 1 and 100% under option 2. Orthodontia is not covered under option 1 and is
covered at 50% under option 2.
All options have cost-sharing of 10% for generic (non-branded) mail order drugs and 20% for
generic retail drugs. All options have a $50 deductible ($100 for family) and a $50 ($100 for
mail-order) maximum per prescription.
All options are shown in the ordinal ranking from more (option 1) to less risk exposure (with the possible exception
of health insurance option 1; see note b and text for details). Column 1 summarizes key features of each option.
Column 2 provides additional details.
a Health insurance: deductibles are shown for the non-single coverage tier; deductibles for single coverage are half
what is shown.
b Option 1 includes a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) in which Alcoa contributes $1,250 in tax free money
each year that the employee can used to fund eligible out of pocket health care expenses. Any balance remaining at
the end of the year can be rolled over to pay for future out of pocket costs. See text for more details.
c Short-term and Long-term disability bene￿ts (column (1)) are proportional to the employee￿ s wage.
29Table A2: List of funds available for 401(k) allocation
Fund name (Asset Class)
Share
a Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Classified (by us) as "Risk Free":
GIC/Stable Value (Fixed Income) 24.47% 0.35 0.02 0.31 0.37
Vanguard Total Bond 3.95% 0.42 0.83 -1.09 1.92
All other classified as risky:
American Balanced (Balanced Equity) 10.58% 0.65 1.36 -2.34 2.89
Inv. Co. of America (Large Cap US Equity) 9.62% 0.83 1.84 -3.82 3.86
AMCAP (Large US Equity) 6.77% 0.66 2.06 -4.19 4.01
Vanguard Institutional Index (Large Cap US Equity) 9.42% 0.79 2.21 -4.18 4.43
MSDW International Equity 4.09% 1.25 2.32 -3.30 4.92
New Perspective (International Equity) 5.34% 1.49 2.72 -4.13 6.32
Putnam OTC (Mid Cap US Equity) 3.23% 1.01 3.40 -6.35 7.45
Small Cap Core (Small Cap US Equity) 0.30% 0.29 3.44 -6.95 7.90
Putnam Vista (Mid Cap US Equity) 3.71% 0.56 3.55 -8.58 6.75
MSDW Emerging Markets 2.62% 3.13 5.83 -11.69 15.03
Company (Alcoa) Stock Fund 15.90% 1.30 6.71 -8.85 16.79
Benchmarks during the same period:
Risk free
b -- 0.37 0.05 0.26 0.43
S&P 500 -- 0.63 2.21 -4.40 4.33
Monthly return
Employee contributions to their 401(k) accounts can be made with either pre- or after-tax dollars. Employees can
contribute 1-16% of eligible pay with some additional restrictions for some highly paid employees. In our sample,
Alcoa usually matches 100% of pre-tax contributions, up to 6% of eligible pay. Employer (Alcoa) contributions are
always invested in the company stock and can only be moved to a di⁄erent fund after two years. In the 2004 data
that we are using, the above 13 funds are available for contributions (sorted by the standard deviations of monthly
returns). In the analysis we use as a measure of riskiness of the portfolio the share of employee contributions invested
in those (two) funds that are presented as least risky. Indeed, as apparent from the table, these two funds exhibit
less volatility (and mostly lower expected return). Employees also have the option to invest in a personal choice
retirement account in which they have access to other funds besides the 13 funds just described. Direct contributions
to this fund are not possible, only transfers, and we do not have detailed data on the composition of investments
in these funds. For our analysis we only use direct employee contributions. In 2004 only about 28 percent of the
sample rebalances and 24 percent of the sample changes the allocation of their contributions. The average employee
contribution in the baseline sample (which restricts attention to non-zero contributions) is around $4,600. About 40
percent of the sample has no contributions to the risk free funds, and about 17 percent invest all their contributions in
the risk free funds. Just over 40 percent of the sample has some employee contributions invested in company stock.
The series of returns are based on monthly returns over the 29 month period from August 2005 to December 2007,
which was the longest time period for which we have consistent returns data for all funds. Returns data are from
CRSP (when available), or from Hewitt (when CRSP data are not available, for the few funds that are not publicly
traded).
a We compute the share of dollars contributed to each fund out of total 401(k) contributions made by all employees
in our baseline sample.
b For the risk free benchmark we use the CRSP three month Fama Risk Free Rates series, which are derived from
average lending and borrowing rates.
30